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TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL TOURISM: THE 
CASE OF GERMANY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tourism is among the world’s biggest industry (Eilat & Einav, 2004). The annual 
growth rates of the number of international tourists averaged about 4.6% between 
1975 and 2000, which roughly corresponds to 1.3 times the growth in global gross 
domestic product (World Tourism Organization, 2007, 2008, undated).  
At the same time the tourism industry is susceptible to shocks, such as terror attacks 
or the incidence of infectious disease (Edmonds & Mak, 2006), which shape the risk 
perception of the destination countries. Against the background of the attacks on 11 
September (9/11), where some 3,000 people died (Enders and Sandler, 2006), opening 
up a new dimension in terrorism, as well as a series of other terror attacks between 
2001 and 2003, studies of the effects on the tourism industry are, indeed, warranted.1  
Even before the 9/11 attacks there had been studies on the effects of exogenous 
shocks on touristic demand. For example, Brady & Widdows (1988) extrapolated the 
number of flight passengers from the US to Europe in the summer of 1986 on the 
basis of a time series from 1973 to 1985. By comparing actual numbers, they deduced 
                                                 
1
 Attacks with more than 40 dead attributable to terrorists since 11 September 2001 include 12 Oct 
2002, Indonesia-Bali, 202 dead (bomb attacks on two nightclubs); 24 Oct 2002, Russia-Moscow, 129 
dead (hostage-taking terminated in the Dubrovka theater); 16 May 2003, Morocco-Casablanca, 45 dead 
(five simultaneous attacks on Western and Jewish facilities); 16 Nov and 20 Nov 2003, Turkey-
Istanbul, 45 dead (bomb attacks on synagogs and in the inner city); 6 Feb 2004, Russia-Moscow, 40 
dead (suicide assassin in an underground train); 2 March 2004, Iraq-Baghdad, Kerbela, 271 dead 
(attacks during Shiite Ashura commemoration); 11 March 2004, Spain-Madrid, 191 dead (attacks on 4 
commuter trains); 24 Aug 2004, Russia, 90 dead (two plane crashes); 1 Sep 2004, North-Ossetia-
Beslan, 330 dead, among them 196 children (fatal end of a hostage-taking in a school); 7 July 2005, 
Great Britain-London, at least 56 dead (bomb attacks on an underground train and a bus); 23 July 2005, 
Egypt-Sharm el-Sheikh, up to 88 dead (bomb attacks on a bazaar, the Ghazala Gardens Hotel and a 
café) (Nonnenmacher 2001). 
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a sharp tumble of up to 70% (for Greece) due to terror attacks and the reactor 
meltdown in Chernobyl. To estimate the effects of terrorism on tourism, intervention 
models have been used predominantly since the 1990s, which are based on Auto-
Regressive-Moving-Average (ARMA) methods. Alternatively, for example, classical 
regression models (Witt & Witt, 1995), exponential smoothing (Saunders, Sharp & 
Witt, 1987) or meta-analyses (Crouch, 1992) are used. Enders, Sandler & Parise 
(1992) present a theoretical model where consumers engage in a two-stage budgeting 
decision. Optimising their choice on trips to country (group) 1, country (group) 2, and 
all other goods, terrorist activities in a country (group) will increase perceived risk of 
consumers associated with trips to these countries. Also empirically, they identified 
substitution effects in the tourism behaviour of tourists with shifts away from 
countries suffering from terror attacks.  
Similar effects were isolated later on by Vester (2001), who was also the first to 
demonstrate regional spillover effects. Pizam & Fleischer (2002) stress that 
significant effects of terrorism on tourism usually occur with a bit of a time delay 
within three to nine months following an attack and vary in length of time. This is 
contrasted by the conclusion drawn by Coshall (2003), who found that the effect on 
the number of flight passengers from the US to Europe is immediate, following an 
attack, and lasts only three to four months. From the mid-1990s there have also been 
more studies into the effects in other geographic regions, besides those regarding the 
tourist demand in Europe and the US, with most of the studies dealing with the 
conflict between Israel and Palestinians (Fleischer & Buccola, 2002; Mansfeld, 1999; 
Pizam & Fleischer, 2002). Pizam & Fleischer (2002) found that certain countries 
recover relatively quickly from terror attacks if they are not followed by additional 
attacks. Repeated terror attacks, however, can result in a lasting decline in tourist 
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demand or wipe it out entirely. The relevance of attack intensity for effects on 
demand has been confirmed by Drakos & Kutan (2003). Apart from studies of an 
economic and econometric nature, there are also ones that examine terror attacks on 
the basis of literature research and interviews (Pizam, 1999). 
Bonham, Edmonds & Mak (2006) and Edmonds & Mak (2006) demonstrate that, 
following the 9/11 attacks, the total worldwide international tourist arrivals decreased 
in the same year, 2001, only by less than one percent compared to 2000. In 2002 they 
had already moved up again above 2000 levels. At the same time, though, some 
countries, such as the US, experience some extreme effects on tourist demand (Ready 
and Dobie 2003, Lee, Oh and O´Leary 2005, Rupp, Holmes and DeSimone 2005). 
Bonham, Edmonds and Mak (2006) have found that, on the basis of growth trends 
before and after 9/11, a recovery effect is not to be expected in the near future. 
Edmonds & Mak (2006) arrive at heterogeneous post-9/11 effects also for the Asian-
Pacific region. While certain countries can recover quickly — also due to simplified 
entry requirements (for example Singapore) — others suffer a sustained decline in 
tourist numbers (for example Malaysia) as a result of follow-up attacks, the infectious 
disease SARS and the uncertain geopolitical situation. Similarly, countries like 
Morocco and Tunisia took longer to recover from the 9/11 attack than other Islamic 
countries, because these two countries suffered additional attacks in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively. What is more, their tourism industries are geared to Western, especially 
European markets, which is why they were particularly hit by the substitution effect 
of European tourists choosing to stay away from Islamic destination countries, while 
there was no compensation from an increase in tourists from other Islamic countries 
(Al Hamarneh, 2004). Anecdotic evidence indicates that Islamic countries are 
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especially impacted by substitution effects that are caused by changes in risk 
perception (Leibritz, 2004).  
The number of studies examining the effects of terror attacks on tourist demand on the 
basis of panel data is relatively small. The paper by Garin-Munoz & Amaral (2000) 
was published before the 9/11 attacks and examines the determinants of tourist 
demand in Spain, identifying a negative effect stemming from the Gulf War. Sequira 
& Nunes (2008) and Eilat & Einav (2004) have determined that a higher security risk 
produces significantly lower numbers of tourists. 
The present work supplements previous publications in a number of respects. First, it 
studies a range of exogenous shocks on tourism that are of distinct magnitude. 
Besides regional effects of 9/11, it also looks at relatively minor terror attacks before 
and after the 9/11 attacks. It is also the first study which explicitly tests substitution 
and adaptation effects in the wake of terror attacks with regard to geographic as well 
as religious proximity while also taking into account substitution from long-distance 
to short-distance trips and distinguishing between long term and short term effects. In 
addition, it is the first multivariate work to study shock-based changes in the tourism 
demand of a regionally limited group (German tourists, who are among the largest 
tourist groups in the world). We study how those changes affect all the countries for 
which sufficient data were available — instead of examining for a selected number of 
target regions the changes brought on by the tourism behaviour of tourists originating 
in various possible source regions. This is interesting, because this approach allows 
for an explicit study of the substitution behaviour of consumers. It is also the first 
work which uses the Difference-in-Difference-Approach (DiD) in order to separate 
the effects of terrorism on tourism demand from unobserved macroeconomic shocks.  
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It has been shown that a decline in tourist numbers occurs not only as a consequence 
of terror attacks, particularly those of 9/11, in the countries affected as well as 
neighbouring countries, but also has global effects in countries with a predominantly 
Islamic population. A heightened risk expectation is, thus, transferred not only 
through geographic but also ethnic and religious proximity. Throughout the paper, our 
analysis concentrates on isolating relative effects on tourist demand from which 
adjustments in risk perception can be inferred while absolute changes in tourist 
demand and the respective determinants are not within the narrow focus of this study. 
Section 2 elaborates on data and methods, section 3 presents results, and section 4 
concludes. 
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The empirical study is based on annual data on arrivals of German tourists in selected 
target countries between 1993 and 2005, which have been obtained from the German 
Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2007).2 German 
Tourists in our data base are defined as persons who live permanently in Germany 
(irrespective of their nationality) and leave Germany for no longer as 12 months, but 
stay at least one night abroad. It includes individuals travelling for business reasons as 
well as to visit relatives etc. 
In total, the data cover 192 countries. By using growth rates, it was possible to 
account for the heterogeneity of the countries represented in the sample, while largely 
                                                 
2
 No further information on age brackets or other demographic variables are reported by German 
Federal Statistical Office (2007). For data limitations such as limited comparability across countries 
due to heterogeneous definitions of “tourist (arrivals)”, diverse methods, sampling and procedures 
of data collection use the links at www.destatis.de > Publikationen > Qualitätsberichte > 
Binnenhandel, Gastgewerbe, Tourismus >  Tourismus > Monatserhebung. 
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ruling out distortions due to different collection methods in determining the number of 
tourists. However, some countries, for example Turkey or Zimbabwe, changed the 
method of calculating tourist numbers in the period under review, which is why they 
have been excluded. 45 countries that were visited by fewer than 1,000 German 
tourists in at least one year were excluded from the study due to high volatility in the 
tourism volume and limited informative value regarding overall trends. The data for 
one or several years are missing for 72 countries. Because one missing raw level data 
point in general implies two missing growth rate observations they were excluded 
from the panel study as well. After filtering countries in this manner, a total of 82 
countries remained for the purposes of the study.  
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics. Average statistics do not highlight that Islamic 
countries have been hit more severely by any post 9/11 tourism crisis. By contrast, 
median values demonstrate that the growth of incoming tourism for Islamic countries 
had been higher than in non-Islamic countries before 9/11. After 9/11, this 
relationship had been reversed. Median growth rates had been especially negative for 
Islamic countries in 2002 and 2003.   
 
Please insert Table 1 about here. 
 
In the context of the study, the differentiation between Islamic and non-Islamic 
countries in regard to the effects of terror attacks on tourism volume depends on 
whether a country is perceived as an Islamic country by (German) tourists or not. The 
percentage of the Muslim population (The World Factbook of the CIA, 2008) is an 
obvious measure, while the definition of a threshold value is not that apparent from 
the start. In order to ensure the robustness of results, all estimates have been done 
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using two treatment groups defined as the percentage of the Muslim population at 
50% and 85%, respectively. While results are qualitatively comparable for both 
specifications throughout our analysis, we present results corresponding to the latter 
specification since the respective definition ensures a perception as an “Islamic” 
country. Figure 1 shows the countries included in our analysis by proportion of 
Islamic population as well as the terrorist attacks considered in this analysis.  
 
Please insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
We use the DiD method, which essentially examines whether the development in 
certain countries (treatment group) before and after the event studied (treatment) is 
different from the control group, which represents a general macro-economic 
development. Demand in tourism is relatively strongly determined by economic 
cycles, seasons and trends, as well as susceptible to macroeconomic shocks, such as a 
rise in oil prices, which increases the cost of flying. The counterfactual provided by 
the control group should account for these macroeconomic conditions. Via the control 
group, a general effect of the 9/11 attacks on the propensity to travel will be absorbed. 
Previous research has shown, however, that the general effect on tourist arrivals was 
marginal, at least on a world-wide scale (Bonham, Edmonds & Mak, 2006, Edmonds 
& Mak, 2006). More critically, we expect that a regionally differentiated impact of a 
globally relevant terrorist attack will harm specific countries in particular, but benefit 
others via substitution effects. We refer to treatment and control groups to allow for 
an ease of comparability with a growing body of quasi-experimental literature, but we 
do not claim that the control group necessarily remained completely unaffected by the 
shock. In fact, our results are indicative of substitution effects away from the 
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countries in the group of treated (towards at least some of those in the comparison 
group). We argue that the substitution effect does not prevent us from achieving the 
main purpose of the analysis: uncovering the channels through which the risk 
perception of countries is altered following terrorism attacks. But the results should 
and will be interpreted as exactly what they are: conditional differences in growth 
rates in tourism into groups of selected destination countries relative the other 
countries in the sample. 
The DiD specification employed here, differentiates annual growth in the tourism 
volume (
      
       
) between groups of countries (treat/control) and periods 
(before/after): 
 
      
       
  (            )                (1) 
 
Touit is the annual number of German tourist in country i in year t, treati is a dummy 
variable denoting the treatment group consisting either of Islamic countries or 
countries of determined treatment regions. postt denotes the period after the event 
considered. Similar to and Redding & Sturm (2005), and Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2004) this approach controls for macro-economic shocks and general trends by 
means of a full set of yearly fixed effects (dt) as well as country-specific fixed effects 
(  ). Since unobserved effects dt can be taken into account for any point in time in 
this way, a parametric specification of the general market development is 
unnecessary. Long-term trends, short-term shocks and cyclical developments can be 
captured in a flexible manner. The country fixed effects φi capture cross-country 
heterogeneity in pre-intervention growth trends while εit is an error term satisfying the 
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usual OLS conditions (Hayashi 2000, ch. 1). Note that compared to standard DiD 
approaches a non-interacted treat term is missing due to perfect collinearity with 
country effects. The estimated coefficient  ̂ gives the average change in growth rates 
across the countries in the treated group relative to the average change in growth 
grates across countries in the control group. 
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Note that by using growth rates as a dependent variable differences in pre-trends in 
tourism flows that would violate the classic DiD assumption are differentiated out. 
Prominent DiD analyses employing alternative specifications include Hotchkiss, 
Moore and Zobay (2003), Galster, Tatian and Pettit (2004) and Eissa and Liebman 
(1996). 
In order to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects, we, similar to 
Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2009), extend specification (2) by an interactive term of the 
treatment identifier and a vector of yearly dummy variables denoting the first years 
after the considered terrorist attack (SHORTt).  
 
      
       
  (            )  (             )             ,  (3) 
 
where b is a parameter giving the difference in the treatment effect between the period 
immediately following the attack, and the long-term effect β. In a similar manner we 
employ an extended specification in order to account for a potential substitution effect 
from long-distance to short-distance journeys over the course of our study period, 
possibly owed to changes in preferences, for example due to climate change. 
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    (4) 
 
where disti is the great circle distance between the geographic centroids of Germany 
and country i and c is a parameter to be estimated that gives the marginal effect on the 
expected growth rates for a 1.000 km increase in distance. 
A common phenomenon in DiD approaches is serial correlation in the error terms, 
which causes inefficiency of estimated intervention effects. Since the LM test for 
serial correlation in a fixed effects model (Baltagi, 2001) clearly rejects the hypothesis 
of no serial correlation, we use an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix as 
recommended by Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan (2004).
3
  
 
RESULTS 
As a first step, the effects of the 9/11 attacks on the tourist demand of German tourists 
in African, American, Asian, Australian, European and Middle-East countries is 
examined on the basis of model specification (3). The delimitation of treatment 
groups is based on the official classification of the Federal Statistical Office 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007). Since the 9/11 attacks occurred towards the end of 
2001 and the literature points to a delay in the effects of between three and nine 
months after terror attacks (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Enders & 
Sandler, 1991; Enders, Sandler, and Parise 1992; Tremblay, 1989), this study, based 
                                                 
3
 One of the anonymous referees clarifies that we estimate with the method of least 
squares using standard errors and t-values which are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
He stresses that our results are valid asymptotically.  
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on annual data, defines the period following the attacks as the period from 2002. 
Results remain qualitatively unchanged if the post-period starts in 2001. 
 
Please insert Table 2 about here. 
 
For African and American countries as well as Australia (table 2, columns 1 to 3), no 
statistically significant deviations have been identified from general tourism trends 
following 9/11.
4
 The results for countries in the Middle East (column 5), however, 
point to a considerable and significant decline during the two years after the 9/11 
attacks, followed by recovery. Accordingly, the annual growth rates of the German 
tourist volume in the Middle East in 2002 and 2003 amounted, on average, to about 
|21.8-37.0| = 15.2 percentage points in each year below those for the reference group, 
which consists of all the countries not included in the treatment group. Recovery set 
in after 2003, with annual growth rates that averaged 21.8 percentage points above the 
average for the rest of the world. Similar, yet attenuated, effects occurred in the region 
of Asia. European countries exhibit an opposite pattern (column 5). In 2004 and 2005 
the growth rates were about 8.9 percentage points below the other countries, while in 
2002 and 2003 the median growth rates corresponded approximately to the average of 
the rest of the world.  
It seems that mostly countries in Asia and in the Middle East suffered the negative 
effects of 9/11 on their tourist volumes. From 2004, however, we see significantly 
positive recovery effects, which go hand in hand with a considerable relative decline 
in the tourist volume in European, primarily Southern European, countries. These 
                                                 
4 Tables and text concentrate on the variables of principle interest. Full results, 
including the coefficients of control variables are available upon request from the 
authors.   
13 
 
findings confirm the substitution effects in tourism behaviour discussed by, for 
example, Leibritz (2004) or Vester (2001), and demonstrated by Bonham, Edmonds, 
and Mak (2006), Edmonds & Mak (2006) as well as Enders Sandler, and Parise 
(1992).  
Since the time after 9/11 in the US saw a significant reduction in tourist volume, 
especially in the Middle East, one must inquire about the underlying transmission 
mechanism. Obviously the risk perception of the tourist destination did not just 
change because of geographic proximity. Instead, the results point to a special decline 
in Islamic countries, which make up a disproportionate percentage of the Middle East. 
This special decline has been discussed in the literature, but has not been proved 
statistically (Al Hamarneh, 2004, Leibritz, 2004). In order to examine more closely a 
potential transmission process behind the risk perception of German tourists, which is 
driven not geographically but by ethnic-religious factors, in the second step of the 
study the effects on the tourist flows, particularly into Islamic countries, are 
examined. 
We begin with a descriptive evaluation of the tourism trends in Islamic and non-
Islamic countries, which we plot (in logs) in Figure 2. Prior to 2001 tourism increased 
in both groups. If at all different, growth was somewhat larger in Islamic countries. 
The 2001 numbers are slightly below, but not way off the pre-2002 linear long-run 
trend (dashed lines). This moderate decline might be an artefact of reduced tourism 
demand during the last four month of 2001 or attributable to macro-economic shocks 
unrelated to the 2001 terrorism. From 2001 to 2003, however, there is a remarkable 
decline in tourism numbers in Islamic countries by 0.24 log points, while tourism 
numbers remain virtually unchanged in non-Islamic countries. After 2003 there is a 
recovery in both groups. By 2004 tourism already exceeds the extrapolated prediction 
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based on pre-2002 trends in non-Islamic countries. In Islamic countries the 2001 
volumes are already exceeded by 2005, although the recovery remains incomplete 
compared to the extrapolated pre-2002 trend. Overall, the trends are strongly 
suggestive of a negative short-run effect that disproportionally hit Islamic destinations 
and a subsequent recovery. This relative decline, furthermore, cannot be explained by 
pre-trends. If one believes that the linear extrapolations in Figure 2 provide a 
reasonable approximation of the counterfactual trends, the DiD estimates based on 
growth rates presented in the remainder of the paper slightly understate the true effect. 
 
Please insert Figure 2 about here. 
 
Column (1) of Table 3 summarizes the effects of 9/11 on a treatment group that 
consists of Islamic countries and is based on the DiD specification (1). It is interesting 
to note that there was no systematic deviation in Islamic countries from the trends in 
non-Islamic countries from 2002 to 2005 across the entire post period. But if a 
distinction is made between short- and long-term effects, it becomes clear that the 
growth rates in Islamic countries in 2002 and 2003 were approximately 10 percentage 
points below those of non-Islamic countries, while they exceeded the latter by an 
almost identical value after 2003 (Column (2)). If a further differentiation is made, 
between the individual years immediately after the attack, a somewhat more marked 
effect for 2003, compared to 2002, emerges (Column (3)).  
Since we cannot reject that there is an ongoing substitution effect from long-distance 
to short-distance journeys owing to other determinants than perceived risk of tourism 
destinations, we repeat the estimates using specification (4). If the average Islamic 
countries were located at a larger distance from Germany compared to the countries 
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of the control group, then the respective substitution effect could have been 
erroneously attributed to the characteristic “Islamic”. Indeed, over the course of our 
study period such a tendency for substituting short-distance for long-distance journeys 
is observable. For a number of years there is a significantly negative relationship 
between growth rates in tourist demand and distance to the respective destination, 
indicating a relative increase in demand for closer locations at the expense of farther 
destinations. This relationship is particularly significant for the year after 9/11, 
confirming the results by Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992). Nevertheless, magnitude 
and precision of the key coefficients of interest remain almost unaffected by 
introduction of the geographic control variables, thereby discarding this substitution 
effect as a potential source of bias. 
 
Please insert Table 3 about here. 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To check the robustness of the substitution effect in the tourism behaviour of German 
tourists, identified in the global sample, away from Islamic to non-Islamic countries, 
the results of regionally limited country groups are compared, which show similarities 
in factors important to tourists, such as climate, vegetation and the range of tourist 
opportunities. The study of the effects of the 9/11 attacks on the growth rates of 
tourist arrivals in Islamic countries is done in a manner analogous to Table 2 for 
Africa, Mediterranean countries and Asian countries. No countries in South or North 
America as well as Australia have been assigned to the Islamic treatment group. The 
Mediterranean region consists of countries in North Africa, Southern Europe and the 
Middle East. 
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Please insert Table 4 about here. 
 
The findings for African countries and Mediterranean countries (Table 4, columns 1-
4) confirm a significant, short-term decline in tourism in Islamic countries following 
the 9/11 attacks, which are characterized, as far as African Islamic countries are 
concerned, by an (overcompensating) recovery starting in 2004. The effects are 
greater in quantity both for Africa and the Mediterranean region than for the global 
study (Table 3), which, again, implies specific ethnic-religious effects of terrorism on 
tourism. The results for Asia show the same quality of pattern as those obtained from 
the global sample, but they are not statistically significant.  
In order to compare the effects of the 9/11 terror attacks, which are geographically 
remote from Islamic countries, with the effects of the following — also islamically 
motivated — terror attacks, additional terror attacks have been analysed in a further 
step (CRP-Infotec, 2008a, 2008b): On 17 November 1997 70 people, among them 50 
foreign tourists, were killed in Luxor (Egypt) in an attack by the group Gamaa al 
Islamiya. On 11 April 2002 the group al-Qaida killed 21 people, among them 14 
German tourists, in Djerba (Tunisia). On 12 October 2002 202 people, among them 
123 foreign tourists, perished on the island of Bali (Indonesia) in an attack by the 
group Jemaah Islamiya. On 16 May 2003 an attack by the group Salafiya in 
Casablanca (Morocco) resulted in 43 deaths. 
The criteria for selecting attacks include the location of the attack (an Islamic country 
where data on arrivals of German tourists are available) and, above all, the 
significance of the attack for tourism. Therefore, attacks have been selected that 
focused on tourist targets and whose victims were primarily tourists. The attack in 
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Egypt in 1997 is an event that occurred before the 9/11 attacks. It was selected so as 
to have a framework for comparison with the effects of the 9/11 terror attacks. The 
Indonesia case allows for insight into the effects on predominantly non-Islamic 
neighbouring states. This should allow for conclusions about geographic proximity as 
a determinant in the transmission process of risk perception.  
Similar to the 9/11 attacks, for the purposes of analysing the terror attacks in Table 5, 
the study looked at the periods after the attacks, with special emphasis on the short-
term effects in the first two years. In the case of Egypt, the year 1998 has been 
marked as the start of the post period, because the attack occurred towards the end of 
1997 (11 November). Column (1), analogous to column 3 in Table 3, has been 
controlled for tourism development in Islamic countries (isl) by isolating the years 
1998-2000. Columns (2) to (6) are similarly controlled for the effects of 9/11 on 
Islamic countries. This way the treatment coefficients can be used to test for 
deviations in tourism development in the treatment countries in relation to the trends 
encountered in Islamic countries. Results remain qualitatively unchanged if controls 
for impact on Islamic countries are omitted.  
Egypt experienced a considerable decline in tourist volume following the 1998 attack, 
but saw an almost complete recovery after one year. In the three years 1998, 1999 and 
2000 it actually recorded significantly higher growth.  
The attack in Tunisia occurred on 11 April 2002, which allowed for the effects on 
tourist numbers to be tested in the same year. In contrast to Column (1), the findings 
(2) point to a weaker development (yet only slightly significant) of Tunisia’s tourist 
volume. Over the long term the growth rates were 9.2 percentage points below the 
reference group; in the short term the year of the attack saw an additional significant 
effect of minus 19.6 percentage points. While the short-term effect was less 
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pronounced than in the 1998 attack in Egypt, Tunisia did not see its tourist numbers 
recover over the medium term.  
The attacks in Morocco occurred on 16 May 2003. As a result, the study looked at the 
effects from 2003 onwards. A (slightly significant) negative relative long-term effect 
has been identified on growth rates of a size similar to Tunisia. The short-term effects 
are not statistically significant. This could be explained by the fact that the attack in 
Morocco, unlike the attacks in Egypt and Tunisia, did not affect German tourists 
directly, which is why coverage in the German media was less comprehensive. In 
addition, there is the possibility of an “adaptation effect”, which causes tourists to 
react less sensitively to attacks. Looking at the 2002 attack in Tunisia, the short-term 
decline in tourist numbers was already less than for the 1997 attack in Egypt.  
The two attacks on Bali in Indonesia on 12 October 2002 were the most consequential 
terror attacks by an Islamic group after 9/11 and resulted in over 200 deaths. Unlike 
the attacks in Tunisia and Morocco, Indonesia, however, exhibited only a short-term, 
statistically significant, effect of approx. 13 percentage points (Column 4) in 2003 
compared to the reference group of Islamic countries. It should be noted in this 
context that the Southeastern region of Asia was affected that same year by the 
infectious disease SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), which also shaped 
the risk perception of the region. Indonesia itself saw relatively little fallout from 
SARS. Therefore, the treatment group in Column (5) is expanded to include the 
Southeast-Asian countries Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand in order to test the joint impact of the terror attack and SARS in the region 
of Southeast Asia (SEA). The region exhibits only a barely significantly but 
somewhat stronger decline in tourism in 2003 than in Indonesia, which cannot be 
explained by regional spillover effects of the attack in Indonesia. To test for any 
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significant deviation in the development in Indonesia compared to the region, the 
specification in Column (4) is expanded in Column (6) to include interactive terms 
that capture the development in the entire region. While there was significant 
difference between the development of Indonesia and its neighbouring states in the 
long term as well as in the first year, 2004 saw the trend go into reverse. Thus the 
region without Indonesia shows a slightly significant recovery, while the tourist 
volume in Indonesia drops once again in relative terms, with this negative effect 
actually exceeding the positive regional effect. It follows therefore that the joint 
impact of the terror attack and SARS had longer-lasting effects in Indonesia than in its 
neighbouring states. Assuming that the effects of the terror attack on Bali diminish 
with distance, a conclusion can be drawn that the terror attack, compared to SARS, 
has produced a longer-term adjustment of tourists’ risk perception. 
 
Please insert Table 5 about here. 
 
In summary, individual events, such as the terror attack in Egypt in 1997, led to 
considerable declines in tourist flows in the regions affected over the short term 
(about a year), but the regions were able to recover relatively quickly. It was not until 
the combination of the 9/11 attacks and further terror attacks in subsequent years that 
tourist volumes were reduced in a sustained fashion in the cases reviewed in the 
study. The findings in Table 4 have been visualized in Figure 3 for Egypt, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Indonesia) in relation to other Islamic countries. Figure 3 also depicts 
the effects of the terror attack 9/11 on Islamic countries compared to non-Islamic 
countries (9/11) (table 3, column (3)). 
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Please insert Figure 3 about here. 
 
Finally it has to be noted that the east and south-east Asian region was subject to the 
2004 tsunami catastrophe. In order to rule out that some of the previous findings for 
the region were driven by the natural disaster we investigate the effects of this shock 
on tourism demand. We found a statistically significant negative effect for the 
tsunami region relative to the rest of the world, but no significant within region 
differentials. Details are available in the appendix. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study, the first to use a DiD approach, examines changes in tourism behaviour 
following 9/11 (2001) as well as the terror attacks in Egypt (1997), Tunisia (2002), 
Morocco (2003) and Indonesia (2003). As a result of the relative effects of 9/11 on 
tourist flows to Islamic and non-Islamic countries, changes in risk perception are not 
transferred exclusively by means of geographic but also ethnic-religious proximity. 
Islamic destination countries showed growth rates in tourist volume in 2002 and 2003 
that were, on average, 16.9 and 22.4 percentage points, respectively, below those 
recorded by the non-Islamic control group. A recovery effect set in starting in 2004, 
so that at the end of 2005 tourist arrivals were only about 1,3% below those in non-
Islamic countries relative to the starting position in 2001 (table 3, column (3)). This 
trend was accompanied by temporary substitution effects in favour of (Southern) 
European states. Moreover, in the course of the period under observation a 
substitution effect was identified, with tourists opting for trips within closer proximity 
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over long-distance tourism, which was particularly highly significant in the year 
following 9/11.  
The findings of the study of the terror attacks in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco confirm, 
as already discussed by Pizam & Fleischer (2002) regarding the tourism industry of 
Israel, that the frequency of terror attacks, as well as their intensity, can be decisive 
for the time during which effects are noticeable. The tourist volume in Egypt after the 
1997 attack more than recovered within only two years, while Morocco and Tunisia, 
which both suffered additional attacks, did not exhibit any indication of a significant 
recovery after two and three years, respectively.  
While attacks after 9/11 produced longer-lasting, stronger (negative) effects, a 
significant attenuation of the effects has been observed in the short term. These results 
provide initial proof of an adaptation effect, which was described by Blinda & Harms 
(2006), but had not been studied empirically yet. While the short-term effects of the 
1997 attack in Egypt were very strong, the effects in Tunisia and Morocco in the 
aftermath of the attacks in 2002 and 2003 were relatively minor. Apparently the attack 
in Egypt was a surprising and novel intervention, which was followed by an 
especially strong adjustment in risk perception. An adjustment of such extent is not 
observed with any of the subsequent attacks. 
Regional spillover effects of terror attacks have been examined for the region 
Southeast Asia on the basis of the Bali terror attacks in 2002. The study has found in 
its (non-Islamic) neighbouring countries a significantly negative relative trend in 
tourism volume in 2003. The short-term effects were at least as marked as in 
Indonesia, which cannot be explained by regional spillover effects, but instead points 
to an additional impact from the infectious disease SARS, which had devastated 
particularly the neighbouring countries in 2002. Over the long term, however, 
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Indonesia, when compared to its neighbouring countries, shows stronger effects on 
tourist volume, which may indicate that terror attacks tend, in relative terms, to 
produce longer-term adjustments.  
Future research should extend the analysis by collecting and analysing the data for 
other countries or even using a world wide basis. In addition if tourists’ subjective 
risk assessment following a terrorist attacks depends – besides economic and 
geographic considerations – on social, ethnic and religious determinants, then similar 
mechanisms are likely to apply also to other economic agents, for example, acting at 
financial markets. For instance, one might expect similar adjustments in the 
distribution of FDI. More research might lead to a more profound understanding on 
the transmission of a broader range of local economic shocks, which, with increasing 
integration, tend to affect more and more regional markets. 
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Appendix 
The east and south-east Asian region, besides SARS and the 2002 terrorist attack in 
Indonesia, was subject to an additional major shock, which is of interest in the context 
of the present analysis: the 2004 tsunami catastrophe. In order to exclude that some of 
the previous findings for the region were driven by the natural disaster we investigate 
the effects of this shock on tourism demand. Therefore, two treatment groups of 
countries that were affected by this shock are defined. The narrow group (Narrow) 
consists of countries that were hit heaviest: Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka. A 
broader group (Broad) in addition also includes India, Malaysia, Maldives and 
Myanmar. Due to data limitations, we are only able to assess the short term impact of 
this shock as revealed by the 2005 growth rates.  
Columns (1) – (3) of Table A1 show results of separate regressions that point to a 
weakly significant inferior growth in countries belonging to the broader treatment 
group compared to the rest of the world, while there seems to be no significant 
differences between the strongly affected countries of the region and their neighbours. 
In columns (4), we set up a simple DiD strategy according to equation (1), where the 
study period covers the years 2004-2005 with 2005 representing the post-period. In 
columns (5) and (6) a control for the east and south-east Asian (ESEA) countries is 
included in order to test for a significant differential in mean growth between the 
countries in the treatment groups and the rest of the south-east Asian region. While 
there is a statistically significant negative effect of approximately 18 percentage 
points for the region relative to the rest of the world, there are no significant within 
region differentials. Although the estimated effect is strong even compared to the 
joint-impact of the 2002 terrorist attack in Indonesia and SARS, it is unlikely to be 
entirely attributable to the tsunami catastrophe, given that the decline in tourism also 
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occurred to countries unaffected by the shock. Tourists appear to have either excluded 
the possibility of a repetition of a similar natural disaster or associated the whole 
region with a higher risk of being hit.  
 
Please insert Table A1 about here. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Share of Islamic population 
 
Data source: CIA (2008) 
Notes: Own Illustration. 
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Figure 2 Tourism trends 
 
Source: own calculations 
Data Source: Statistical Office Germany, see data description  
Notes: Red (black) solid lines show the mean across tourist numbers by year for Islamic and non-
Islamic countries in the data set. Dashed lines are fitted into the pre-period (up to 2001) and 
extrapolated for the remaining years. 
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Figure 3 Estimated Impact of Terrorism Attacks on Tourism 
 
 
Source: own calculations 
Data Source: Statistical Office Germany, see data description 
Notes: Figure shows indices of relative tourism development for years after intervention. For 9/11 
index shows development of Islamic vs. non-Islamic countries (table 3, column (3)), other indices refer 
to tourism in the respective countries while controlling for 9/11 effect (exception: Egypt, 1998-2000) 
(table 5). 
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Tables 
 Table 1: Tourist arrivals, descriptive statistics 
 
Absolute No. Growth Rates (unweighted) 
 
 1993-2001 2002-2005 1994-2001 2002-2005 2002 2003 
Average       
All Countries (N=82) 733,504 775,628 5.6% 4.6% -1.3% -1.8% 
Islam. Countries (N=12) 154,190 151,832 4.7% 4.5% -5.1% -6.6% 
Non-Islam. Countries (N=70) 832,815 882,564 5.7% 4.7% -0.7% 3.3% 
       
Median       
All Countries 45,694 52,961 2.6% 2.8% -2.1% 2.0% 
Islam. Countries 25,391 17,725 3.5% 1.0% -7.6% -8.4% 
Non-Islam. Countries 49,016 53,845 2.5% 3.1% -1.6% 2.6% 
       
Standard Deviation       
All Countries 2,339,260 2,437,635 14.0% 8.9% 21.9% 17.3% 
Islam. Countries 252,262 258,916 6.9% 11.5% 25.3% 16.6% 
Non-Islam. Countries 2,516,330 2,621,273 14.8% 8.4% 21.2% 17.1% 
Source: own calculations 
Data Source: Statistical Office Germany, see data description 
 
 
Table 2: The effects of 9/11 on various (treatment) regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Africa America Australia Asia Middle 
East 
Europe Southern Europe 
post x treat -0.0561 
(0.0473) 
0.00946 
(0.0413) 
-0.0293 
(0.0323) 
0.120*** 
(0.0439) 
0.218* 
(0.110) 
-0.0889** 
(0.0435) 
-0.196*** 
(0.0667) 
short_1_2 x treat 
0.0568 
(0.0731) 
0.0450 
(0.0549) 
0.0357 
(0.0271) -0.172
*** 
(0.0590) 
-0.370*** 
(0.108) 
0.0878* 
(0.0480) 
0.144** 
(0.0610) 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control group World World World World World World World 
Observations 984 984 984 984 984 984 984 
R² 0.156 0.156 0.155 0.165 0.165 0.159 0.163 
Source: own calculations 
Data Source: Statistical Office Germany, see data description  
Notes: post represents the period from the year following the attack to the end of 2005. short_1_2 
represents the two years following the attack. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for 
clustering on country. *, **, ***: significant at the 10/5/1% level. All models include country and year 
effects. 
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Table 3: Effects of 9/11 attacks on Islamic countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Isl. Countries  Isl. Countries Isl. Countries Isl. Countries 
post x treat -0.00338 0.0950* 0.0950* 0.1035* 
 (0.0405) (0.0500) (0.0500) (0.5226) 
short _1_2 x treat  -0.197***   
  (0.0680)   
short _1 x treat   -0.169* -0.191** 
   (0.0860) (0.8928) 
short_2 x treat   -0.224*** -0.2202** 
   (0.0659) (0.0665) 
dist x 1994    -0.0038 
(0.0064) 
dist x 1995    -0.0078 
(0.0053) 
dist x 1996    -0.0255** 
(0.0097) 
dist x 1997    -0.0126*** 
(0.0038) 
dist x 1998    -0.0098** 
(0.0043) 
dist x 1999    -0.0132* 
(0.0077) 
dist x 2000    -0.0109* 
(0.0064) 
dist x 2001    -0.0092* 
(0.0052) 
dist x 2002    -0.0205*** 
(0.0040) 
dist x 2003    -0.0030 
(0038) 
dist x 2004    -0.0044 
(0.0044) 
dist x 2005    -0.0069 
(0.0046) 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES 
Control group World World World World 
Observations 984 984 984 984 
R² 0.155 0.162 0.162 0.174 
Source: own calculations 
Data Source: Statistical Office Germany, see data description  
Notes: post represents the period from the year following the attack to the end of 2005. short_1_2 
represents the two years following the attack, post_1 the year immediately after the attack and short_2 
the second year after the attack. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on 
country. *, **, ***: significant at the 10/5/1% level. All models include country and year effects.  
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Table 4: The effects of 9/11 in Islamic countries in different regions 
   (Basis: Regression model (3)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Isl. Countries 
Africa 
Isl. Countries 
Africa 
Isl. Countries 
Mediterranean 
Isl. Countries 
Mediterranean 
Isl. Countries 
Asia 
Isl. Countries 
Asia 
post x treat 0.159** 0.159** 0.168 0.168 0.061 0.061 
 (0.0723) (0.0723) (0.102) (0.102) (0.0962) (0.0964) 
short _1_2 x  -0.379***  -0.298**  -0.0810  
Treat (0.0799)  (0.114)  (0.147)  
short _1 x 
treat 
 -0.364** 
(0.1326) 
 -0.309 
(0.1829) 
 -0.102 
(0.1673) 
short_2 x 
treat 
 -0.394** 
(0.0559) 
 -0.288*** 
(0.0586) 
 -0.060 
(0.1443) 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control group Africa Africa Mediterranean Mediterranean Asia Asia 
Obs 
156 156 180 180 276 276 
R² 0.176 0.176 0.207 0.207 0.278 0.278 
Source: own calculations 
Data Source: Statistical Office Germany, see data description  
Notes: post represents the period from the year following the attack to the end of 2005. short_1_2 
represents the two years following the attack, post_1 the year immediately after the attack and short_2 
the second year after the attack. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on 
country. *, **, ***: significant at the 10/5/1% level. All models include country and year effects. 
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Table 5: Terror effects in countries that suffered attacks 
   (Basis: Regression model (3), with additional dummy variables for  
      country specific terror attacks and additional controls) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Egypt  Tunisia Morocco Indonesia SEA  Indonesia 
post x treat 0.463*** 
 
-0.0924* -0.0869* 0.0273 -0.0028 0.0265 
 (0.0974) (0.0490) (0.0505) (0.0510) (0.0531) (0.0780) 
short_1 
 x treat 
-0.932*** -0.196** -0.0358 -0.133** -0.146* 0.018 
x treat (0.960) (0.0851) (0.0657) (0.0647) (0.0702) (0.1041) 
short_2 0.382*** -0.025 0.0196 -0.0310 0.0612 -0.1049*** 
x treat (0.0821) (0.0643) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0408) (0.03177) 
post x SEA    
  
0.0178 
(0.104) 
short_1x  
SEA 
   
  
-0.149* 
(0.0828) 
short2_ x 
SEA 
   
  
0.078* 
(0.0411) 
post x isl -0.126 
(0.1009) 
  
  
 
short_1 x isl 0.169 
(0.1031) 
  
  
 
short_2 x isl 0.224** 
(0.0943) 
  
  
 
2002-2005 x 
isl 
 0.103* 
(0.0535) 
 
0.102* 
(0.0536) 
0.094* 
(0.5412) 
0.095* 
(0.0502) 
0.096* 
(0.0547) 
2002 x isl  -0.152 
(0.0535) 
-0.176** 
(0.0881) 
-0.168* 
(0.0885) 
-0.169** 
(0.0861) 
-0.171* 
(0.0889) 
2003 x isl  -0.222*** 
(0.0712) 
 
-0.220*** 
(0.0711) 
-0.213*** 
(0.0703) 
-0.221*** 
(0.0651 
-0.227*** 
(0.0708) 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Contr. group World World World World World  
Observations 984 984 984 984 984  
R² 0.180 0.163 0.162 0.162 0.164  
Source: own calculations 
Data Source: Statistical Office Germany, see data description  
Notes: post represents the period from the year following the attack to the end of 2005, or, in the case 
of Egypt, the period from 1998 to 2000. short_1 represents the year immediately after the attack and 
short_2 the second year after the attack. 2002, 2003 and 2002-2005 are dummy variables describing the 
corresponding years. Given the short post period, no interactive term for the second year has been 
applied in the case of Morocco. Isl is dummy denoting countries with a proportion of Islamic 
population of above 85%. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on 
country. *, **, ***: significant at the 10/5/1% level. All models include country and year effects. 
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Table A1: Impact of 2004 Tsunami Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Broad 
(a)
 Broad 
(a)
 Narrow 
(a)
 Broad 
(a)
 Braod 
(a)
 Narrow 
(a)
 
Treat -0.104* -0.112 0.080    
 (0.0563) (0.0795) (0.105)    
post x treat 
(b)
    -0.177** -0.0191 -0.063 
    (0.0.0818) (0.131) (0.0113) 
post x ESEA
(b)
     -0.188* -0.205** 
     (0.112) (0.0912) 
Year E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control group World ESEA ESEA World World World 
Period 2005 2005 2005 2004-2005 2004-2005 2004-2005 
Obs 82 19 19 164 164 164 
R² 0.032 0.091 0.027 0.673 0.708 0.709 
Source: own calculations 
Data Source: Statistical Office Germany, see data description  
Notes:  
(a) The narrow group consists of Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka. The broad group in addition also 
includes India, Malaysia, Maldives and Myanmar. 
(b) post indicates the year 2005. ESEA is the sample of east and south-east Asian counties.  
Models (4) – (6) include year and country effects. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are adjusted 
for clustering on country.  
*, **, ***: indicate 10/ 5/ 1%-significance levels. 
All models include country and year effects. 
 
